ANALYSIS: Ivory Coast’s Disputed Election and the Rising Specter of a Coup: What Implications?
By Hans Ngala
In May this year, Ivory Coast’s social media spaces were awash with rumors https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/24/why-did-rumours-of-a-coup-sweep-ivory-coast-this-week of a coup. While the rumors later turned out to be false, their very circulation points to the possible threat of one in a region marked by successive coups in recent years. Also, President Alasane Ouattara’s victory in the country’s October presidential election, in which he won by nearly 89.8 percent, reflects a worrying trend across West Africa.
In the build-up to the country’s election (the same month as Cameroon’s), a similar pattern to what was observed in Cameroon played out in the Ivory Coast: key opposition figures were barred https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cddrzl9nmm2o ) from running, and the authorities cracked down on opposition figures. Former president, Laurent Gbagbo, was barred by an Ivorian court on “criminal charges” while another leading opposition candidate, Tidjane Thiam, was barred on grounds of dual nationality. This exclusion of key opposition figures gave Outtara an easy ride to victory as he obtained nearly 90 percent of the votes.
The opposition cried foul, calling Gbagbo’s victory a “civilian coup’d’etat” https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cddrzl9nmm2o . This choice of language in itself is very telling as it exposes the lingering possibility or perhaps desire for a coup in the country as frustration with the Outtara government mounts.
Outtara violated https://www.africanews.com/2025/07/30/ivory-coast-opposition-says-presidents-fourth-term-bid-violates-the-constitution// the constitution to run for this fourth term, and while his supporters applauded his win, it helped sow the seeds of discontent that often lead to the desire for a military takeover.
The International Crisis Group states in a recent analysis that the Ivory Coast has not had a peaceful election in 30 years. Since 1995, every election cycle in the cocoa-rich country has resulted in violence, and the 2025 election was no exception. At least 230 protesters were jailed in the country for protesting against Outtara’s decision to seek an unprecedented fourth term.
The developments came at a time when Cameroon was experiencing similar developments with incumbent Paul Biya.
In Nigeria https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/24/nigeria-replaces-top-security-officials-days-after-coup-plot-denial ), President Bola Tinubu fired nearly a dozen army officials for allegedly plotting a coup. While the Nigerian coup plot was foiled, Gen Z-led protests in Madagascar https://apnews.com/article/madagascar-protests-coup-rajoelina-2ad2d10b4d0715d5c446ac526963bf37 ) culminated after three weeks with yet another coup and former President Andry Rajoelina fleeing the country.
The developments in Nigeria and Madagascar, while not directly related, point to a pattern of growing discontent among young Africans, disillusioned with their government, and reflect how the military tends to side with protesters in politically volatile situations, which the Ivory Coast will do well to take note of.
What Are the Implications?
Ivory Coast lies in a neighborhood where coups https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577 have been the norm for decades, with recent coups sweeping through again in the 2020s from Mali, to Niger, and Burkina Faso. While the Ivory Coast is the richest French-speaking country in Africa south of the Sahara, it cannot afford to fall into military rule. While Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have largely turned to Russia for security and trade, the dangerous pattern with this is that it risks disrupting the Ivory Coast’s stable economy and plunging it into further chaos if a military takeover happens. This would be to the benefit of the Russians who enjoy a warm reception in neighboring countries, as already pointed out.
Ouattara’s victory may ultimately prove short-lived, not merely because of the political dynamics at play but also due to the fundamental reality of time. At 83, President Alassane Ouattara stands among the continent’s oldest leaders https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/10/28/elderly-african-leaders-holding-power/ still in active office. His age alone raises concerns about continuity, succession, and stability. These concerns are not abstract—they have historically triggered political tension in several African states, especially where leaders overstayed their constitutional limits. The uncertainty surrounding what comes after Ouattara, and who might ascend in a post-Ouattara era, only deepens existing anxieties among Ivorians.
For the opposition, the 2025 post-election transition feels like a replay of older grievances that were never resolved. The exclusion of Laurent Gbagbo and Tidjane Thiam was not just a technical legal matter; it was seen by many as politically engineered to secure Ouattara’s victory. Such actions tend to compound bitterness, not suppress it. The opposition’s declaration of the election as a “civil coup d’état” signals a rhetorical escalation that can easily translate into actual political mobilization—especially in a region where recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have reframed military takeovers as expressions of “popular will.”
The risk is not merely the risk of Ivorians turning on each other. Ivory Coast is a strategic economic hub in West Africa. Instability there would have subregional consequences all over West-Central Africa. This is where Russia’s emerging influence becomes relevant. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, coups created fertile ground for Russian mercenary https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230 and political influence to expand. These countries now rely heavily on Moscow for security cooperation and, increasingly, political backing. Should Ivory Coast slide into political instability, this could create yet another opening for Russia to step in, especially if the West hesitates or fails to respond effectively. Already, we are seeing gaps in a place like Mali, where jihadists are reclaiming territory and recently executed a TikToker for showing support to the Malian army.
According to the International Crisis Group https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/cote-divoire/318-electoral-puzzle-handling-cote-divoires-high-risk-poll , for the country to avoid a scenario where the military seizes power and to ensure that the Ivory Coast does not become the next domino in West Africa’s coup wave, three key steps are essential:
1. A Genuine National Dialogue
Ivory Coast must convene an inclusive political dialogue that brings together the ruling party, key opposition leaders (including those barred from contesting), civil society groups, and religious leaders. The aim should be to address grievances surrounding the election, clarify the constitutional controversies, and chart a roadmap for political reforms. Without this space for collective negotiation, resentment will continue to simmer and could spill over into violent confrontation.
2. Judicial and Constitutional Reforms
The controversies over Ouattara’s eligibility exposed deep flaws in the interpretation and enforcement of the constitution. Strengthening the independence of the courts, revising the conditions for candidacy, and ensuring transparent electoral rules would help restore confidence in democratic processes. The absence of such reforms creates space for instability—and invites the military to step in under the guise of “restoring order,” as seen elsewhere in the Sahel.
3. Security Sector Professionalization
Ivory Coast’s military has historically been both a stabilizing force and a source of uncertainty. Reforms must ensure that the armed forces remain loyal to constitutional authority and insulated from political manipulation. Programs that improve welfare, training, and civilian oversight can play a crucial role in preventing the military from becoming an alternative political actor—and prevent external actors like Russia from exploiting any fractures within the security establishment.
Ultimately, preventing the Ivory Coast from sliding toward a political crisis is not merely about protecting an election outcome. It is also about safeguarding a fragile democratic project in a region where democracy is under siege. If Ouattara’s government fails to address the legitimacy crisis surrounding his fourth term, the country may face a volatile mix of popular frustration, aging leadership, unresolved political exclusion, and opportunistic foreign influence. This combination is precisely what has led to repeated coups elsewhere in West Africa, and the Ivory Coast cannot afford to go down the same path.
